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Dow Chemical vs. ‘Coercive Utopians’: Constructing
the Contested Ground of Science and Government
Regulation in 1970s America
Amy M. Hay
In 1979, the Dow Chemical Company published an excerpt from a
speech by H. Peter Metzger that announced an emerging conflict
in American ideals and public policy. He stated that a new kind of
individual inhabited Washington, people from the counterculture
who were “coercive utopians” because they sought to achieve their
agenda through covert actions and hoped to end the American free
market economy. Following the 1962 publication of Rachel
Carson’s Silent Spring and the subsequent banning of DDT in
1972, Dow and other chemical manufacturers fought to keep the
regulatory climate favorable to industry. Dow found itself
defending the phenoxy herbicide 2,4,5-T in particular for almost
the entire decade of the 1970s. Using Dow Chemical Company
records, trial transcripts, scientific journals, and writings by
environmental activists, it becomes possible to see the contested
landscape of scientific knowledge and chemical regulation. This
essay argues that Metzger's “coercive utopians” challenged the
assumed scientific basis of chemical safety and used the regulatory
powers of the state to reassess the safety of everyday chemicals.
This established a pattern of contested knowledge and ideological
conflict that continues to form the core of debate between public
safety and free-market prerogative.

“The environmentalists have had the biggest victories: Ranking jobs . . .
have gone to men and women who have . . . lobbied . . . for conservation,
protection of wildlife and clear air and water.” 1 With these words, social
“The Point Is . . . : A Summary of Public Issues Important to the Dow Chemical
Company,” no. 8, 21 Dec. 1979, folder 6471, box 215, series IX, “Media Response,”
unprocessed, Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange, National Agricultural
Library, Beltsville, Md., hereafter cited as the Young Collection.
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critic H. Peter Metzger observed the kind of people populating Washington, D.C., and various government agencies under the Jimmy Carter
administration. He went on to distinguish such individuals as different
from the usual political appointees, the beneficiaries of the routine spoils
system. These members of the counterculture, he warned, wanted to do
more than simply enjoy political patronage; they wanted to dismantle the
basic mechanisms for generating wealth in the country. These “coercive
utopians,” as Metzger labeled them, sought to achieve their goals covertly.
Those goals included a reduction in per capita energy consumption, a shift
from fossil fuels to solar energy, and an undetermined form of economy
that bore no relation to capitalism or private ownership. Metzger’s
warning appeared in a 1979 Dow Chemical Company brochure and revealed the growing concern the chemical industry in general, and Dow in
particular, held toward the new regulatory climate that had emerged in
Washington during the 1970s. For Dow and corporations like it, new
legislation like the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), newly
created agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and
new advisory bodies like the president’s Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) all heralded a new regime of public interest that would “strangle”
society through regulation, review, and repeal of existing and potential
chemical licenses and legislation. During the decade of the 1970s, from
the banning of DDT in 1972 through the controversy over the herbicide
2,4,5-T and its associated dioxin contaminant at the end of the decade,
Dow would fight these “coercive utopians” and their vision of a government more responsive to the health and ecological concerns of ordinary
Americans. This established a pattern of contested knowledge and
ideological conflict that continues to form the core of debate between
public safety and free-market prerogative.
The Dow Chemical Company ranked as the second most profitable
industrial chemical producer in the United States in 1993, with revenues of
$12.5 billion, behind only DuPont’s $15.6 billion in revenue. 2 Founder
Herbert Dow located the company in Midland, Michigan, and the
company grew in tandem with the twentieth century. It started as a major
supplier of chlorine-based bleaching powder and caustic soda produced
through an electrolytic process. The company began making sodium
chloride, which initially was used to produce synthetic chloroform, and
later used to make magnesium and calcium chloride. Chloroform
manufacture generated carbon tetrachloride, a major component of
agricultural chemicals and pesticides.
Dow entered the field of petrochemicals in the 1930s. This decade saw
the development of two major chemical products, Styron and vinylidene
chloride, which in turn were the basis of Styrofoam and Saran. These
products meant that Dow’s major profits came from supplying the
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Shaping the Industrial Century: The Remarkable Story
of the Evolution of the Modern Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industries
(Cambridge, Mass., 2005), 13.
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ingredients for household items like plastic wrap and cleaners.
Agricultural chemicals represented a small portion of the company’s
product profile. 3
Financially, the 1970s were for chemical companies, in the words of
business historian Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., a “turbulent decade.” 4 The
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Counties (OPEC) successfully raised
the price of a barrel of crude oil from $2 to almost $30. The economy more
broadly suffered from stagnation, and for some, the increased scrutiny of
chemical regulations endangered popular products. Dow, along with other
chemical manufacturers, had acquired the right to produce 2,4-D and
2,4,5-T at the end of the Second World War. Initially researched as plant
growth regulators, the phenoxy herbicides represented a major component
of the U.S. development of biological weapons during the 1940s through a
partnership between university and military scientists. Their use as
biological weapons came about with the realization that these hormonelike substances could be used to kill plants through an acceleration of
growth. The commercial application of these plant growth inhibitors as
effective plant herbicides had begun almost before the war had ended. 5
Along with the organochlorine insecticide DDT, synthetic fertilizers, and
new farm equipment, the phenoxy herbicides represented one of the major
discoveries with agricultural applications made during World War II. 6
Legal maneuvering stripped American Chemical’s patent rights to the
herbicides, and the major chemical companies shared production of the
herbicides after the war. 7 Although they were not a major part of Dow’s
chemical product line, commercial herbicides generated significant
revenue, growing to over 70,000 acres treated with herbicides for total
expenditures of $270,750,000 in 1962. 8
One other important episode needs to be discussed before examining
the 1970s and Dow’s battles against the “coercive utopians” in more detail.
As part of a larger pattern of student protest against the Vietnam War,
described in one contemporary account as “unrestrained anarchy,” Dow
Chemical became a nationally recognized name because of its manufacture
of a military weapon, napalm B. 9 Napalm, essentially jellied gasoline in its
Chandler, Shaping the Industrial Century, 55-56.
Ibid., 28.
5 Gale E. Peterson, “The Discovery and Development of 2,4-D,” Agricultural
History 41 (July 1967): 244-48.
6 Nicholas Rasmussen, “Plant Hormones in War and Peace: Science, Industry,
and Government in the Development of Herbicides in 1940s America,” Isis 92
(June 2001): 294.
7 Rasmussen, “Plant Hormones in War and Peace,” 308, 309.
8 Peterson, “Discovery and Development,” 243.
9 Philip Boffey, “Campus Unrest: Riots Bring Danger of Punitive Backlash,”
Science, n.s., 164 (11 April 1969): 165; Patrick D. Kennedy, “Reactions against the
Vietnam War and Military-Related Targets on Campus: The University of Illinois
3
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modern form, had many previous incarnations in warfare dating back to
Greek fire. U.S. military leaders argued for its use in South Vietnam
because of the entrenched nature of enemy troops. In 1966, Dow was the
second biggest contractor for napalm after United Technology Center,
which had begun to experience protests against their production of
napalm at their Redwood City, California, plant. 10 After 1966, during the
escalation of the Vietnam War and protests against it, Dow Chemical
became the only producer of napalm B after the other chemical
manufacturers discontinued production in response to anti-war protests.
The first demonstrations against Dow occurred at its New York City
headquarters, where demonstrators marched and urged the boycotting of
Saran Wrap. The company responded by noting that it supported the right
of all Americans to non-violent, legal protest. The official statement went
on to give the company’s position: “Our position on the manufacture of
napalm is that we are a supplier of goods to the Defense Department and
not a policy maker. . . . Simple good citizenship requires that we supply our
government and our military with those goods which they feel they need. .
. .” 11 The decision thrust Dow into the national spotlight, as antiwar
demonstrations spread to college campuses across the country, and Dow
recruiters became prime targets.
While initially student protests had focused on Dow’s Midland
headquarters, the first campus protests took place at Wayne State
University in Detroit during Dow’s 1966 recruiting campaign. Military and
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) recruitment moved off-campus,
preventing students from disrupting their recruitment activities. Dow,
confident of their ethical stance, remained on campus. As antiwar
sentiments intensified, so too did the Dow campus protests. 12 There were
over 133 campus incidents in 1967, beginning with a violent demonstration at Los Angeles State College. Recruiters were taken to another
building after demonstrators flooded the original site. The men escaped a
student mob through a back window, fought their way to their car, and
eventually were able to drive the car away. Perhaps the most visible
violence broke out later that year at the University of Wisconsin’s Madison
campus, after the Dow recruiter was prevented from leaving the building
by over two hundred student protesters. When student demonstrators
refused to leave the building, campus security called in local police. Sixtyfive people were injured, including three policemen; nine students were

as a Case Study, 1965-1972,” Illinois Historical Journal 84 (Summer 1991): 10118.
10 Lawrence E. Davies, “Napalm Foes Petition for Vote to Bar Factory in Coast
City,” New York Times, 17 April 1967, p. 8; E. N. Brandt, Growth Company:
Dow Chemical’s First Century (East Lansing, Mich., 1997), 352, 353.
11 Brandt, Growth Company, 353.
12 Ibid., 354, 355.
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arrested, and police used tear gas to disburse the protesters. 13 Following a
protest at Harvard on October 26, Dow officials declared they would
ignore campus protests and continue their recruitment efforts. 14 Later that
year, Dow chairman Carl Gerstacker admitted that the protests had hurt
Dow; consumers were urged to boycott its products and divest its stocks,
and the company had to devote considerable time addressing the problem.
He again asserted, however, Dow’s commitment to supplying “American
soldiers in Vietnam” the weapons they needed to fight the war. 15 Dow
received public support from the president of IBM, who challenged
protesters’ demands that Dow quit manufacturing napalm and pointed out
that almost all companies were contributing to the war in Vietnam. 16 From
1966 through the end of 1967, Dow recruiters experienced five hundred
demonstrations on three hundred college campuses. Although the protests
appeared not to have damaged Dow’s recruitment efforts, and the
company itself boasted of its successful resistance to antiwar pressure even
after it quit producing napalm, the years 1966 to 1969 saw the company
engaged in a national battle against what one company insider called the
“Flower Children” over one of its products. 17
In 1970 came an embarrassing admission from Dow vice-president
Julius Johnson, testifying before a House Subcommittee on the “Effects of
2,4,5-T on Man and the Environment,” chaired by Michigan Senator Philip
Hart. Johnson testified that samples of 2,4,5-T submitted for analysis by
Bionetics Research Laboratories in 1964 contained significant amounts of
a contaminant commonly known as dioxin, a highly toxic substance. In his
testimony, Johnson argued that current testing measures had identified
high levels of dioxin in the 2,4,5-T herbicide produced by the company in
1964, and that current production had decreased dioxin contamination to
trace levels. He recommended a review of communications and protocol
even as he urged that regulatory decisions over matters of science continue
to be based on scientific evidence and expertise. 18 Ten years later, Dr.
C. Gerald Fraser, “Antiwar Protest Ends in Violence,” New York Times, 19 Oct.
1967, p. 8; Brandt, Growth Company, 355, 356.
14 “Harvard Protest Delays Dow Aide,” New York Times, 26 Oct. 1967, p. 7; Gerd
Wilcke, “Dow Will Ignore Campus Protests,” New York Times, 27 Oct. 1967, p. 6.
15 “Dow Chief Says Protests Hurt,” New York Times, 18 Nov. 1967, p. 14.
16 “Napalm—A Useful but not a Pretty Weapon,” New York Times, 20 Dec. 1967,
p. 247.
17 Anthony Ripley, “Napalm Protests Worrying Dow, though Company Is
Unhurt,” New York Times, 11 Dec. 1967, p. 2; Robert J. Cole, “ ‘Keep your cool,’
Dow Advises Targets of Antiwar Protesters,” New York Times, 4 June 1970, p. 59;
Brandt, Growth Company, 351-62.
18 Julius E. Johnson, “Statement of Dr. Julius E. Johnson, Vice President, Dow
Chemical Company, April 7 and 15, 1970,” Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Energy, Natural Resources, and the Environment of the Committee on
Commerce; United States Senate, Ninety-First Congress, Second Session on
13
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Samuel Epstein, a vocal critic of U.S. chemical regulatory policy, would
charge that Dow had knowingly withheld information about the toxicity of
the 2,4,5-T produced for the manufacture of Agent Orange herbicides used
during the war from 1964 until 1970. 19 Dow spent the decade defending its
phenoxy herbicides in general, and 2,4,5-T in particular. Three key events
put the company on the defensive: the production and use of Agent
Orange herbicides as a chemical defoliant during the Vietnam War; the
1970 creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and transfer
of chemical regulation to that agency from the Department of Agriculture
USDA); and the 1972 banning of the insecticide DDT.
When efforts to use fires to clear jungle growth in South Vietnam
failed, the phenoxy herbicides once again drew military interest. What
would eventually be called Operation Ranch Hand gained Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara’s support in 1961, and defoliation operations
began in January 1962, the same year Silent Spring was published. Over
the next ten years the United States released approximately eleven million
gallons of an equal measure of 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D, which came to be known
as Agent Orange, over the South Vietnamese countryside. Along with
Orange, which received its name from the orange stripe around storage
barrels, Agents Blue and White were designed to destroy crops, depriving
Viet Cong soldiers of food and forest brush cover that might hide enemy
troops. 20
From the beginning spraying operations received heavy criticism.
Antiwar activists charged that the herbicide campaign qualified as
chemical warfare and violated the 1925 Geneva Convention prohibition on
such military weapons. Others raised questions about the ethics of
destroying crops in a part of the world that routinely saw people die of
starvation. As the war continued, and the amount of herbicides used
increased, biological and environmental scientists began expressing
concerns about the possible long-term effects of herbicide defoliation on
the Vietnamese countryside and possible harmful health effects on the
Vietnamese people. 21 In 1969, the release of a report conducted by the
Effects of 2,4,5-T on Man and the Environment, April 7 and 15, 1970
(Washington, D.C., 1970).
19 Karen DeWitt, “House Hearing Is Told Dow Knew in 1964 That Defoliant Was
Toxic,” New York Times, 23 July 1980, A18.
20 Alvin L. Young, “The Toxicology, Environmental Fate, and Human Risk of
Herbicide Orange and Its Associated Dioxin,” Technical Report (Brooks Air Force
Base: USAF Occupational and Health Laboratory, Oct. 1978), I-10, Young
Collection.
21 Charles Mohr, “U.S. Spray Planes Destroy Rice in Vietcong Territory,” New
York Times, 21 Dec. 1965, p. 1; Benjamin Welles, “Pentagon Backs the Use of
Chemicals,” New York Times, 20 Sept. 1966, p. 1; Russell Betts and Frank
Detton, An Evaluation of Chemical Crop Destruction in Vietnam (Memorandum:
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Oct. 1967), 8, 9; Edward B. Fiske,
“Clerics Accuse U.S. of War Crimes,” New York Times, 4 Feb. 1968, p. 1; Bryce
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Bionetics Research Laboratories for the National Cancer Institute
attracted even more critics. The report suggested that the phenoxy
herbicides potentially could cause human harm, including birth defects. A
follow-up investigation commissioned by the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare was undertaken, with the results released late in
1969. The Mrak Report supported the conclusions of the Bionetics study,
and recommended that 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T both be immediately restricted
to prevent human exposure. These health studies only intensified the
public debate over the defoliation campaign and fueled further
investigation on the part of government and scientific societies. The
Department of Defense sponsored a study of the ecological effects of heavy
herbicide usage in 1967, while the American Association for the
Advancement of Science sent a team of scientists to Vietnam in 1970 to
evaluate the environmental harm to the Vietnamese people and mangrove
forests. Concerns over the safety of DDT, the pesticide singled out in Silent
Spring, had already forced Richard Nixon’s administration to begin
revising federal chemical regulation and environmental policy. 22
Nixon appointed a commission to study the effects of pesticides, the
very Mrak Commission that supported the findings of the Bionetics study.
As a result of the Mrak Commission’s findings, early in 1970 the USDA
cancelled all residential use of DDT, with further review of other uses of
the chemical (agricultural and industrial) expected to follow. An article by
Thomas Whiteside on defoliation operations published in The New Yorker
prompted the Senate to set up a Subcommittee, headed by Democrat
Senator Philip Hart, to investigate pesticide use. Congressional representative Richard D. McCarthy (D-NY) entered his findings from hearings
held in Globe, Arizona, where residents charged that U.S. Forest Service
spraying of the Tonto National Forest had produced deformities in
domestic animals. Opponents of defoliation used the public questioning of
pesticide safety to urge stopping spraying operations in Vietnam. 23 Nixon
and his advisors thought that the creation of the Environmental Protection
Agency in 1970 would help the administration promote itself as proNelson, “Herbicides in Vietnam: AAAS Board Seeks Field Study,” Science 163 (3
Jan. 1969): 58, 59; Arthur W. Galston, Letter to the Editor, “Defoliants in
Vietnam,” New York Times, 2 Oct. 1969, p. 46; Thomas Whiteside, “Defoliation,”
The New Yorker (7 Feb. 1970), 32-69.
22 W. B. House, et al., Assessment of Ecological Effects of Extensive or Repeated
Use of Herbicides (Kansas City, Missouri: Midwest Research Institute/DOD,
1967); J. Brooks Flippen, “Pests, Pollution, and Politics: The Nixon Administration’s Pesticide Policy,” Agricultural History 71 (Fall 1997): 443-45.
23 “Major Congressional Action: Effects of Herbicides,” 1970 CQ Almanac (Feb.
1970), 495, folder 10, box 3, Paul Cecil Collection (Texas Tech University: The
Virtual Vietnam Archive); hereafter cited as the Cecil Collection; for
congressional debates on defoliation, see “Environmental Warfare in Vietnam,”
Congressional Record–Senate 116 (19 Feb. 1970), 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 4111-12.
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environmental, while at the same time protecting the interests of
agriculture and industry. As a result of the new agency, the oversight of
pesticides moved from the Department of Agriculture to the EPA.
The USDA’s previous oversight of pesticide regulation and the fact that
it oversaw the Forest Service, a major user of herbicides during the 1970s,
meant that agency officials and scientists remained significantly influential
regarding pesticide policy. This influence also complicated things for
officials at the EPA, as they increasingly found themselves charged with
investigating and regulating issues of environmental risk. After months of
political posturing, industry legal action, and bureaucratic maneuvering,
the Nixon White House banned the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam in
April 1970, but Agent Orange herbicides continued to be sold domestically
despite official EPA cancellation of 2,4,5-T’s registration. 24 In 1971, after
Johnson’s testimony at the Hart hearings, Dow and Hercules, Inc., sought
to void the cancellation of 2,4,5-T. This allowed the companies to continue
selling the herbicide while a special advisory committee was formed to
perform the administrative review. The nine-member committee, drawn
from members of the National Academy of Sciences, submitted a report to
the EPA. Leaks of the unpublished report suggested that it was
contradictory at best, disingenuous at worst. The major problem with
2,4,5-T, the committee asserted, lay with its contamination with dioxin.
Such minor “environmental leaks” were acceptable in the eyes of the
committee. 25 EPA administrator William D. Ruckelshaus decided,
however, to continue the existing restrictions on 2,4,5-T in contradiction
to the advisory committee’s recommendation. Ruckelshaus’ decision
highlighted the “shambles into which the official decision-making
machinery [of the EPA] has lapsed.” 26 Domestic use of 2,4,5-T would
continue. A commentary on the embarrassing role played by the National
24 The actual process by which Agent Orange was discontinued and the different
policy decisions, agencies, and legal action make for a very confusing story. I have
significantly compressed and summarized this process for this essay. For a
history of the association between the USDA’s Bureau of Entomology and
industry, see Thomas R. Dunlap, “Farmers, Scientists, and Insects,” Agricultural
History 54, in “Agricultural History Symposium: Science and Technology in
Agriculture” (Jan. 1980): 93-107; Jonathan B. Tucker, “A Farewell to Germs: The
U.S. Renunciation of Biological and Toxin Warfare, 1969-1970,” International
Security 27 (Summer 2002): 107-48, discusses the evolution of Nixon’s policy
and the eventual banning of Agent Orange in Vietnam; Carol Van Strum, A Bitter
Fog: Herbicides and Human Rights (San Francisco, 1983), 14, 15; for the EPA’s
charge, see Sheila Jasanoff, “Science, Politics, and the Renegotiation of Expertise
at EPA,” Osiris, 2d ser., 7, “Science after ’40” (1992): 197, 198.
25 Thomas Whiteside, “Department of Amplifications” The New Yorker (14 Aug.
1971), folder 09, box 02, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 - Technology, accessed
on The Virtual Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.
26 Nicholas Wade, “Decision on 2,45-T: Leaked Report Compels Regulatory
Responsibility,” Science, n.s., 173 (13 Aug. 1971): 615.
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Academy of Sciences, which provided a list of possible candidates, but had
no say in who was chosen for the committee, pointed to the approval
expressed by industry groups like the National Agricultural Chemicals
Association. “With verdicts like that of the 2,4,5-T committee, the
pesticide manufacturers’ satisfaction with the status quo is no more
surprising than the Academy’s discomfiture.” 27 Dow successfully overturned the cancellation when Ruckelshaus failed to hold public hearings,
as required by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act. 28
Most historians credit the 1962 publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent
Spring as a major influence in the emergence of the modern environmental movement. Carson, however, simply condensed and popularized
information based on over a decade of studies and growing scientific
concern in the 1950s over the effects of DDT use on the natural
environment and human health. 29 Given that pesticide use increased
dramatically between the publication of the book and 1972, the year DDT
was finally banned, it was a much-needed clarion call. 30 While Carson had
alerted the American public, opponents of chemical pesticides shifted from
a campaign of public information and education to one of litigation by the
late 1960s, most significantly in the Wisconsin hearings of 1968 and 1969.
Using over two decades of scientific studies, the Environmental Defense
Fund (EDF) successfully changed not only the legal and regulatory climate
but also public opinion about the necessity of using persistent chemical
insecticides. 31 Although the battle would have to be fought again against
the EPA, the EDF’s legal efforts finally resulted in the banning of DDT in
1972. As an iconic chemical, DDT appeared to be the first of many victims
of the new understandings of the environment influenced by Silent Spring,
understandings less than sympathetic to industry and industrial
products. 32 The EDF also stood as the exemplar of Metzger’s “coercive
utopians” or Brandt’s “flower children,” and such groups—local, regional,
and national—would become the avowed enemies of Dow Chemical.
Determining the toxicity of 2,4,5-T remained an elusive process,
although evidence slowly mounted. In a September BioScience article,
Dow vice-president Johnson presented a lengthy summary of the existing
“2,4,5-T Committee: Bias Untested, Academy Embarrassed,” ibid., 611. The
committee was chosen by the USDA, a longtime industry ally.
28 Van Strum, Bitter Fog, 14, 15.
29 Thomas R. Dunlap, DDT: Scientists, Citizens, and Public Policy (Princeton,
N.J., 1981), 59-71.
30 David Pimentel, “After Silent Spring: Ecological Effects of Pesticides on Public
Health and on Birds and Other Organisms,” in Rachel Carson: Legacy and
Challenge, ed. Lisa Sideris and Kathleen Dean Moore (Albany, N.Y., 2008), 19094.
31 Dunlap, DDT, 130, 197-209, 231.
32 Steve Maguire, “Contested Icons: Rachel Carson and DDT,” in Rachel Carson:
Legacy and Challenge, ed. Sideris and Moore, 194-214.
27
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information on exposure, toxicity, and chemistry of 2,4,5-T. Johnson cited
extensively from unpublished data from Dow Chemical and concluded that
“the widespread use of phenoxy herbicides has produced no demonstrable
evidence of potential harm to man.” 33 According to Johnson, the rapid
degradation of the phenoxy herbicides made them safe for use.
Disagreement continued, however. Part of the problem, as one researcher
noted, lay in “the inadequacy of present practices surrounding the design
and analysis of toxicological experiments.” 34 The 1973 announcement of
the detection of dioxin in frozen fish samples typified the growing body of
scientific evidence indicating potential harm. The samples, taken by the
American Association for the Advancement of Science’s 1970 Herbicide
Assessment Commission, provided the “first hard evidence that TCDD
[dioxin] is indeed finding its way into animals—and thus into a food chain
that could include man—in Vietnam.” 35 Events in Oregon would bring the
2,4,5-T/dioxin controversy to a head.
Carol Van Strum opens her book A Bitter Fog recounting a spring day
in 1975. Four children had gone fishing in the local river when a tank truck
sprayed herbicides along the sides of the road, just above the river bank
where the children played. Drenched, the children all became sick that
night, with symptoms that included burning skin, mouths, throats, and
eyes. Garden plants wilted and died, and the family dog was eventually
paralyzed, covered with oozing sores. This episode marked Van Strum’s
involvement with a substance that would consume her life, sometimes
literally, for the next decade. The Van Strums began alerting the county
health department, wildlife rangers, the Forest Service, and the EPA.
Their letters to the EPA were answered by the USDA, which reassured the
Van Strums that no studies had demonstrated the effects they had
described. Steve Van Strum researched the herbicides at the Oregon State
University library, and the couple requested a copy of the 1976
Environmental Impact Study (EIS) put out by the Forest Service. In the
process of researching the chemical herbicides, the Van Strums contacted
reporter Thomas Whiteside, who had published extensively on Agent
Orange herbicides. He referred them to more studies and scientists who
had expressed concern about the safety of 2,4-D, 2,4,5-T, and the TCDD
present in the herbicides used to clear roadways and manage local timber
stands. Frustrated and concerned, the couple let the matter drop. 36
Officials had already ignored earlier concerns.
Julius E. Johnson, “The Public Health Implications of Widespread Use of the
Phenoxy Herbicides and Picloram,” BioScience 21 (1 Sept. 1971): 905.
34 Theodor D. Sterling, “Difficulty of Evaluating the Toxicity and Teratogenicity of
2,4,5-T from Existing Animal Experiments,” Science, n.s., 174 (24 Dec. 1971):
1358.
35 “Dioxin from Defoliation Found in Vietnam Fish,” Science News 103 (5 May
1973): 287.
36 Van Strum, Bitter Fog, 1-9.
33
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Dependent on the timber industry for many of its citizens’ economic
livelihood, Oregon became the battleground over which industry (timber
and chemical), citizens, and government agencies fought. As the major
industry in the state, timber interests exerted significant political and
social influence throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The state’s 1941 Forest
Conservation Act effectively decreased the amount of federal regulation,
and the timber industry acted in its best interests. One problem that
plagued loggers was the lack of access roads, which made it difficult to
access valuable old-growth timber. 37 Roads would be built and access
maintained through the application of herbicides. The Forest Service also
began spraying timber stands with herbicides to achieve better brush
control and to lessen the chances of fire. Jean Anderson and her husband
Ugo Pezzi owned a 1,300-acre ranch bordering on Indian Creek, in the
Five Rivers area and close to the Suislaw National Forest. The couple
requested information from the Forest Service in 1972 after their land was
exposed when herbicides were sprayed in 1971. Concerned about the
herbicides’ effects on their organic beef herds, not to mention their own
water supply, Anderson and Pezzi requested a public hearing in 1973.
When the couple filed a lawsuit after a Forest Service official denied the
public hearing, the Forest Service agreed to not spray the area’s
watershed. 38 Subsequent events late in 1975 ignited local residents’
concerns over the potential hazards of the phenoxy herbicides.
In a December 1975 newspaper article, Oregon State faculty member
Michael Newton proclaimed the safety of herbicide sprayings and alarmed
the Van Strums in the process. Newton, a member of the 1974 National
Academy of Sciences team that assessed herbicide spraying in Vietnam,
advocated for herbicide spraying to control for undesirable timber growth
and increase more valuable timber types. The Van Strums responded to
the story, and in the process drew the attention of the local community to
the problems many attributed to herbicide exposure. 39 This mobilization
proved to be the genesis of an organization formed to represent the
communities of Five Rivers and Deadwood Creek, Citizens Against Toxic
Sprays (CATS). The situation intensified, and along with the Oregon
Environmental Council and the Hoedads (a tree planting cooperative),
CATS filed suit in 1976 to stop spraying in the Suislaw National Forest.
The groups charged that the Forest Service EIS’s from 1975 to 1977 had
been inadequate. The Industrial Forestry Association joined the Forest
Service as a defendant. CATS and its allies filed a new motion that sought
to ban 2,4-D, 2,4,5-T, and Silvex. 40 Tensions rose as local residents
confronted Forest Service and county officials determined to carry out
William G. Robbins, Landscapes of Conflict: The Oregon Story, 1940-2000
(Seattle, 2004), 169, 170.
38Van Strum, Bitter Fog, 55, 56.
39 Ibid., 77-83.
40 Robbins, Landscapes of Conflict, 197.
37

Amy M. Hay // Science and Government Regulation in 1970s America

12

spraying operations. 41 In March, Judge Otto Skopil issued a temporary
injunction banning the use of 2,4,5-T and Silvex pending Forest Service
explanation of the effects of dioxin on human and animal health. In 1977,
Skopil approved the revised EIS, removing the injunction against
herbicide spraying. Three-fifths of a planned 150,000 acres would be
sprayed with 2,4,5-T. This would be the state of affairs until the results of a
controversial EPA study that linked herbicide exposure to miscarriage
rates three times the national level were released in 1978.
Dow used several strategies to discredit the possible link between
2,4,5-T sprayings and miscarriages. In summer 1978, Bonnie Hill and
seven other women living in Alsea, Oregon, contacted the EPA concerning
thirteen miscarriages that the eight women had experienced since 1973. In
response to its investigation, early in March 1979 the EPA issued an
emergency suspension of 2,4,5-T and Silvex and began a more intensive
study analyzing greater numbers of soil, water, animal meat, and human
milk samples to determine the presence of dioxin (this larger and more
intensive study would be known as Alsea II). The study attracted the
attention of the mainstream news media, including investigative pieces by
syndicated columnist Jack Anderson and ABC’s news series 20/20. The
Council of Agricultural Science and Technology (CAST) criticized the
20/20 segment. Dow flew Oregon State expert Michael Newton and his
wife to Midland, Michigan, to strategize. 42 CAST, however, had begun to
attract negative attention of its own, as the full membership of the
organization, beyond its twenty-five independent societies became known.
Over two hundred agricultural business corporations and industrial trade
organizations also belonged to the organization, and those members
provided 57 percent of its operating budget. Such relationships raised
questions about the group’s claim to scientific neutrality. 43 Dow itself
challenged the Alsea study as “unscientific” and “seriously flawed.” 44 Dow
chairman Earle B. Barnes betrayed a more revealing attitude in a written
response to a clergyman when he characterized the Alsea area as one
similar to “northern California and other northwestern states in growing
marijuana in open spaces and in forests.” These illegal marijuana crops,
worth $900 million in California alone, were susceptible to the 2,4,5-T
Van Strum, Bitter Fog, 91, 92.
Robbins, Landscapes of Conflict, 200-203.
43 Robin Marentz Henig, “Agriculture’s Strange Bedfellows: CAST-Industry Tie
Raises Credibility Concerns,” BioScience 29 (Jan. 1979): 9. The May 1979 issue
contained several letters to the editor regarding the CAST article, among them
one from John E. Donalds, Agricultural Products Department, Dow Chemical
U.S.A. Donalds questioned whether “highly respected and dedicated scientists”
could be bought for $5,000 annual dues. “CAST Profile Evokes Avid Response,”
BioScience 29 (May, 1979): 279.
44 Jeffrey Smith, “EPA Halts Most Use of Herbicide 2,4,5-T,” Science, n.s., 203
(16 March 1979): 1090-92; “Dow Attacks Study Used to Ban 2,4,5-T,” Science
News 115 (17 March 1979): 166.
41
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herbicides used by the Forest Service to kill underbrush. Barnes implied
that the reports, which had shown “no valid relationship between the
spraying and miscarriages,” were prompted by financial interests rather
than health concerns. 45 In a more creative fashion, Dow offered a scientific
discovery as one explanation for the ubiquitous presence of dioxin.
In 1977, Dow scientists focused their energies on discovering the
source of dioxin contamination that had polluted the Tittabawassee River,
the major waterway in which Dow discharged its manufacturing wastes.
Their concern was increased by the knowledge that the EPA or the
Michigan Department of Natural Resources could shut down the Midland
plant, which was the only Dow facility that manufactured pesticides. In
November 1977, Dow company officials announced they had found the
culprit: the “entire environment.” Dioxin levels were detected not only in
fish from the river, but also in ash from incinerators, power plants,
fireplaces and charcoal grills—anyplace where combustion took place. In
the words of one official, “We now think dioxins have been with us since
the advent of fire.” 46 Warren B. Crummett, the technical director of Dow’s
analytical labs, discussed the hypothesis, “the trace chemistries of fire,” in
his 2002 memoir, Decades of Dioxin: Limelight on a Molecule. Crummett
criticized the EPA’s failure to achieve balanced scientific judgment on
acceptable dioxin levels, claiming that “veiled advocacy is still evident in
the interpretation of the data.” 47 John Davidson, a Dow chemist, gave a
more forthcoming description of the discovery: “We learned so much
about dioxins in order to defend our pesticides.” 48 If nothing else, the
discovery of the universal presence of dioxins, according to the scientist in
charge of the investigative team, meant that no one needed to worry about
them. At the very least, Dow scientists offered up the theory as one reason
for the geographic presence of dioxin contamination. 49
Scientists continued to debate the safety of 2,4,5-T and its associated
dioxin contamination, even as the EPA fought to maintain its emergency
suspension of the chemical. Some confidently proclaimed that the
herbicide posed no hazard to human or animal kind, even if the individual
invoked less than reliable support, such as Auburn professor Donald E.
Davis did in a 1979 BioScience article looking at the history of 2,4,5-T.
Davis gave a general account of the chemical’s history, but also relied on a
1974 CAST report and the contradictory National Academy of Science’s

Brandt, Growth Company, 367. Brandt notes that this was the “first and only
time Dow used [this] argument.”
46 R. Jeffrey Smith, “Dioxins Have Been Present Since the Advent of Fire, Says
Dow,” Science, n.s., 202 (15 Dec. 1978): 1166.
47 Warren B. Crummett, Decades of Dioxin: Limelight on a Molecule (Philadelphia, Pa., 2002), 223.
48 Smith, “Dioxins Have Been Present,” 1167.
49 Etcyl H. Blair, “The Safety of 2,4,5-T,” Science, n.s. 206 (7 Dec. 1979): 1136.
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report on herbicides in Vietnam. 50 Professor Arthur Galston, who had
worked on the plant growth inhibitors as a graduate student at the
University of Illinois, offered a much more cautious, although no more
definitive, assessment of 2,4,5-T. He recognized that industry and
environmental scientists disagreed on the evidence and what policy
decisions should be made. His own professional judgment urged “extreme
caution,” and he acknowledged that other classes of herbicides might
prove equally dangerous. No matter the financial or emotional cost,
however, Galston cautioned that the public welfare might demand the
banning of industry’s favorite compounds. 51 An April 12, 1979, court ruling
denied the request by a coalition of timber industry, chemical
manufacturers, and herbicide applicators (including Dow) that the
emergency suspension be lifted. The EPA’s case, dependent on the Alsea
study, appeared to be weak. It was not helped by the conviction of one of
its lead scientific witnesses for stealing funds from his government grant. 52
For Dow management, it was imperative to fight to keep 2,4,5-T legal. As
Dow executive Paul Oreffice described it: “If we let them ban a product
that has 30 years of studies behind that says it’s safe, what happens to the
next product, and the next product, and the next?” 53 The court case
dragged until Dow eventually conceded the battle in 1983, $10 million
later.
Dow continued to fight Americans’ changed environmental
consciousness, as it defended its pesticide products. A 1981 issue of The
Bottom Line, Dow’s free newsletter, proclaimed the publication as the
“final conclusion about the role of pesticides in society . . . THE BOTTOM
LINE is also an information clearinghouse for scientific facts about the
pesticide dilemma.” 54 The lead story, entitled “A Familiar Scenario with a
New Cast,” examined the script written by the Alsea, Oregon, case and the
“pesticide road show being restaged in Missoula, Montana; Ashford,
Washington and Peevy’s Crossing, Oklahoma.” 55 The article went on to
applaud the formation of a group in Montana, Citizens for Food and Fiber,
dedicated to “prompt collective action. . . .” Another citizens’ group had
formed in Washington, the Washington State Pest Management Alliance,
committed to “scientific reason and rationale” in putting out the antiDonald E. Davis, “Herbicides in War and Peace,” BioScience 29 (Feb. 1979): 94.
Arthur W. Galston, “Herbicides: A Mixed Blessing,” ibid., 84.
52 R. Jeffrey Smith, “Court Reluctantly Upholds EPA on 2,4,5-T Suspension,”
Science, n.s., 204 (11 May 1979): 602; Susan Walton, “2,4,5-T: Case Study in
Regulatory Confusion,” BioScience 30, “Food from Microbes” (June 1980): 427;
William J. Broad, “Ski Trips Cost Researcher His Job,” Science, n.s., 207 (15 Feb.
1980): 743, 744.
53 Brandt, Growth Company, 364.
54 Dow Chemical Company, The Bottom Line, Jan. 1981, folder 5961, box 212,
Young Collection.
55 Ibid.
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pesticide fires. As the article editorialized, “It is time for more of this kind
of citizen action, where grass roots elements representing farmers,
foresters, applicators, agri-women and other proponents of free enterprise
defend the agricultural chemical tools that are important to everyone’s
standard of living.” Finally, The Bottom Line included a poem by an
anonymous author, “Silent Fall.” A clear satire of Silent Spring, the poem
told of the downfall of civilization as society banned a wide array of
agricultural chemicals, condemning the surviving humans to grow their
own food. “The remaining few lived like animals. Feeding themselves on
creatures and plants around them. And these were called Organic
Foods.” 56
Dow Chemical spent more than a decade fighting the agenda of the
“coercive utopians” and defending the free enterprise system. In the
process, it played a major role in contesting the scientific knowledge of
herbicide safety, the right of the state to set regulatory policy, and the
concerns of ordinary citizens over the safety of everyday chemicals that
were sprayed on their fields and trees. It appears unclear whether Dow
Chemical won its case against the covert, subversive “flower children”
determined to change business as usual in Washington and throughout the
country. Ironically, by the end the company seemed to have conceded the
success and power of the counter-culture, seeking to create its own
grassroots social movement of farmers, sprayers, and agri-women. Given
its involvement with some of the most contentious events in the postwar
period—the use of napalm and Agent Orange during the Vietnam War,
toxic chemicals and the emergence of a risk-averse society—Dow tried to
remain true to its vision of an America composed of free opinions, citizens,
and enterprise.

56

Ibid., 3.

